By Orit Kedar
This ebook proposes an institutionally embedded framework for studying voter selection. citizens, Orit Kedar argues, are keen on coverage, and consequently their vote displays the trail set through political associations top from votes to coverage. lower than this framework, the extra institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are outfitted into the political procedure (e.g., multi-party government), the extra electorate atone for the dilution in their vote. this easy yet ignored precept permits Kedar to provide an explanation for a vast array of probably unrelated electoral regularities and provide a unified framework of study, which she phrases compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory common sense in 3 electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional version within the measure of strength sharing, she analyzes voter selection, accomplishing an empirical research that brings jointly institutional and behavioral facts in a huge pass component to elections in democracies.
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Extra info for Voting for Policy, Not Parties: How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing
The conversion from votes to seats to policy formation is set by institutions, and different institutional mechanisms will convert identical vote-share profiles to different policy outcomes. If voters are concerned with policy, institutional mechanisms converting their votes to policy will find their way into voter decision rules and consequently into voter choices. In systems in which power is straight platform implementation, voting for policy may lead voters to endorse the party ideologically most similar to their own views.
Indeed, in majoritarian systems there is little incentive for voters to compensate, since little bargaining and compromise take place. In some such systems, a single party is in power and the government has almost complete agenda-setting power. However, in others, the opposition has its say in formation of policy via various mechanisms. Avakumovic (1978) discusses how through placing issues on the agenda, the CCF-NDP has affected policy in Canada for years. A Theory of Compensatory Vote 27 Similarly, Meguid (2005) shows how emerging niche parties take part in shaping the agenda by raising issues for public discussion, and, over time, forcing established parties to incorporate them into the discourse.
Part II tests empirically the argument in three electoral arenas. Chapter 3 focuses on parliamentary systems. I derive an empirical model parallel to the theoretical model and estimate it on a sample of fourteen parliamentary democracies that vary in their institutional design. I conduct the analysis in two steps. First, I estimate a model of voter choice in each polity, analyzing the degree to which voters compensate for the watering-down of their vote. Second, utilizing measures of diffusion of power in parliaments, I account for variation in compensatory vote across parliamentary systems.
Voting for Policy, Not Parties: How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing by Orit Kedar