By Franz C. Brentano
First released in English in1966, the real and The obtrusive is a translation of Franz Brentano's posthumous Wahrheit und Evidenz, edited through Oscsar Kraus. The e-book comprises Brentano's influential lecture "On the concept that of Truth", learn ahead of the Vienna Philosophical Society, various essays, drawn from the gigantic wealth of Brentano's unpublished fabric, and letters written via him to Marty, Kraus Hillebrand, and Husserl. Brentano rejects the general models of the "correspondence conception of fact" and proposes to outline the genuine when it comes to the obvious. In criticising the metaphysical assumptions presupposed by way of the correspondence idea, he units forth a notion of language and truth that has as a result turn into referred to as "reism".
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Extra resources for The True and the Evident
Let me therefore simply append one or two passages indicating that Kant does not think of the object as being that which, in the manner of a rule, guides and influences the function of thinking. “All presentations have, as presentations, their object, and can themselves in turn become objects of other presentations. Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only presentations, which in turn have their object—an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is transcendental object=x.
There is not the slightest doubt! Kant, too, retained the Aristotelian definition of truth as correspondence of judgement with reality. And so we can assert that all epochmaking thinkers after Aristotle, however revolutionary their procedure when tackling other questions, found no reason to make any change here. 24. But, as Windelband’s own case makes clear, there have been attempts to replace the Aristotelian conception. 2 We find such a view in Sigwart, for example, although he occasionally has recourse to the old conception of truth.
If the judgement asserting Peter’s existence corresponded no more closely to Peter than Peter corresponds to Paul, then it would not be true, or at least it would not be a truth about Peter. But if the judgement completely corresponded to Peter, it would be identical with him and would be Peter himself. Yet Peter is outside my mind, not in it. Thus Professor Dilthey of Berlin uses this position to argue against the possibility of our knowledge of the external world as it really is. In his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* he justifies this thesis in the following words: “For an idea or presentation [Dilthey conceives judgement as a connection of ideas] can never be identical with a thing, inasmuch as the thing is conceived as a reality independent of the idea.
The True and the Evident by Franz C. Brentano