



# **A Guide to Philosophy in Six Hours and Fifteen Minutes**

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Witold Gombrowicz  
*Translated by Benjamin Ivry*  
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
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## **A Guide to Philosophy in Six Hours and Fifteen Minutes**



# First Lesson

Sunday, April 27, 1969

Referendum \*

## Kant 1724–1804

Beginning of modern thought.

One could also say that this is *Descartes* (beginning of the 17th century).

*Descartes*: a single important idea: *absolute doubt*.

Here rationalism begins: subject everything to absolute doubt, until the moment when reason forces us to accept an idea.

(Basis for the phenomenology of Husserl)

—subject: thinking self

—object: opera glasses—table

—the idea of an object which forms in my consciousness.

Descartes reduces these three aspects of knowledge.

I am certain that this is in my consciousness but does not correspond to reality. For example, the centaur.

Systematic doubt. Puts the world in doubt, in parentheses:

1. the object.

2. everything involving the object.

The only certainty is that they exist *in my consciousness*.

In parentheses:

the idea of God;

the sciences which relate to reality (supposedly objective): sociology, psychology, except for the abstract sciences; mathematics and logic, because they do not concern the outside world, but are laws for my own consciousness.

What is Descartes' great error, "deviation" (to use Husserl's term)? *Descartes feared the terrifying consequences* of his ideas. He tries to show the objective reality of God—and therefore of the world (as God's creation).

Descartes' fear is similar to that of Sartre. Because of it, all his later philosophy was distorted. For Descartes, the important thing is *Discourse on the Method*. TO ELIMINATE THE OBJECT: Descartes' great idea.

Philosophy begins to deal with consciousness as something fundamental. Imagine an absolute night, with a single object. If this object does not encounter a consciousness capable of sensing its existence, then it does not exist.

There is no individual consciousness, but *consciousness* in general.

(The brain's consciousness, etc.)

The dog.

Descartes, precursor of modern thought.

Kant

Berkeley (rural youth)

Hume.

Kant

Newton, especially.

Descartes.

Kant is based on rational knowledge, organized scientifically. Influenced by Newton.

Works: *Critique of Pure Reason*; *Critique of Practical Reason*

Kant's big thing: *Critique of Pure Reason*.

It is not about a critique of pure reason; we want to judge our own consciousness. *Consciousness judged by consciousness*. Example: can we be sure of the existence of God through philosophical deduction?

*Questions*: to what extent can one be sure about consciousness? To what extent can consciousness be authentic?

Kant's reasoning in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, even expressed obscurely, is:

Everything that we know about the world is expressed in judgments.

For example, "I exist," and a conditional judgment, "If I kick Dominique, \*he'll kick me twice."

*This is the connection of causality.*

Judgments are analytical or synthetic.

Analytical judgments are those which derive from analysis, dissecting a whole into its significant parts. Kant says that analytical judgments add nothing to our knowledge because they underscore an element of their definition.

Example, the definition of man: living being, mammal, etc. Take the notion "living": "man is a living being." Why? Because there is decomposition. It is a concept drawn from another concept, in other words, an element drawn from the definition.

*Synthetic judgments*. A different approach: adding something. Therefore they enrich our knowledge of the world.

Synthetic judgments have no *a priori* value ( *a priori*: independent of any experience).

Synthetic judgments are *a posteriori*, in other words, based on experience.

Example: water boils when it reaches a certain degree of heat.

Enrichment of our knowledge. New phenomenon in our understanding of the world.

*A posteriori* judgments are not always accurate. Example: there is no guarantee that water will begin to boil again on the 10,000th try.

Kant seeks precision. He grips reality. A solid mind.

Nevertheless, there are some synthetic judgments which are *a priori*, which add something to reality, but at the same time one is convinced of their infallibility. Newton's influence.

Example: the action is equivalent to the reaction.

From the moment that we discovered this, we are certain that *it will always be that way*.

Example: the shortest distance between two points is a straight line.

Yet for Einstein, the shortest distance between two points is a curved line. But that does not change anything, because it is a different reality from that of Newton. If you accept all of Newton's premises, then Newton's laws are absolute in the context of his reality.

Some synthetic judgments are:

*A priori*—which increase our knowledge—and which are absolute and valid for all of humanity.

The whole problem of Kantian philosophy thus resides in a single question: how are *a priorisynthetic* judgments possible?

Kant asks this question because such judgments, without being accidental or based on experience, nevertheless enrich our knowledge, without being accidental or based on experience. Synthetic —which provides an eternal novelty.

Kant proceeds with

*three analyses*

three sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

But since the subject is reason, or organized knowledge, everything must be based on synthetic knowledge.

It is science which formulates *synthetic, a priori* judgments (that is, eternal).

*First part: Transcendental Aesthetics.*

(Transcendent means something outside of the self).

Aesthetics used in the mathematical sense.

Mathematics: science of forms and relationships.

In this first part: How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible in mathematics?

*Second part: Transcendental Analytics.*

We treat judgments in *physics*. Everything that we know about the subject of things (behavior, reactions). All that is the object of physics.

It is the science of things.

*Third part: Transcendental Dialectics*, where he deals with metaphysical problems such as that of the “existence of God.”

With Kant begins the great reduction of thought, a process which lasts to the present day.

For the first time consciousness asks the question: *What are the limits of consciousness*(of reason)?

*Kant’s great coup.* He had some stunning ideas that completely changed everything.

*Question:* How are *a priori synthetic* judgments possible?

*Answer:* *A priorisynthetic* judgments are possible in general and therefore in transcendental aesthetics, *because time and space are not a property of things but rather a property of the subject.*

In order for something to exist for us, we must inject it with time and space.

And here Kantian reasoning is simple.

He says, “There are three reasons why space does not exist in the objective world outside us, but is an integral part of our consciousness.”

*First argument.* Space does not come from an experience, *but is the inevitable condition of all experience.* Space is not an object but the condition of the existence of the object. Space does not derive from experience.

*Second argument.* Space is not a concept obtained by deduction. We cannot understand it as concrete, because it is not an object. Space is pure intuition. In other words, space is not a thing but the condition of a thing, because we possess it within ourselves.

*Third argument*(or rather, consequence). The intuition of space is the inevitable condition of our *a priorisynthetic* judgments, conferring objective reality on things.

Without it, these are merely impressions (parallel to Descartes).

Example: geometry, resting on constructions in space, on figures, is not based on experience but valid because [ *sentence incomplete in the text*]. \*

*Conclusion*

We have demonstrated that Kant's *a priorisynthetic* judgments are in fact *analytical judgments*.

This splendid construction collapses.

And Kant's idea of the categories of pure reason will collapse as well.

That is the fate of all philosophy. No system endures. Through philosophy, human consciousness in progress discovers itself for itself, as Hegel will say so magnificently.

—There is no point in asking whether one should do philosophy or not. We do philosophy because we must. It is inevitable. Our consciousness asks us questions and we must try to resolve them. Philosophy is a necessary thing.

What was the most profound vision of the world in the 18th century? One finds it in Kant, without whom it would be impossible to know the development of consciousness through the centuries. Philosophy is needed for a global view of culture. It is important for writers.

Philosophy allows us to organize culture, to introduce order, to find ourselves, and to attain intellectual confidence.

## Second Lesson

Monday, April 28, 1969

### Kant: The Categories

Two elements do not belong to external reality, but are injected by us into the object: space and time.

Space is not an object, but the condition for every possible object.

The reasoning is the same for time.

*Time* is not a thing that can be tested, but all things are *in* time.

One can very well imagine time without phenomena, but it is impossible to imagine a phenomenon without time.

Same argument for space.

One cannot imagine different time (like objects: table, chair). Time is always the same. It does not derive from our observation of the external world but is a direct intuition, an intuitive knowledge, that is, an immediate knowledge.

We need to add that time permits *a priori* synthetic judgments in arithmetic. The impressions that we have of the external world follow each other in succession; this is what arithmetic is about: 1-2-3-4. It is a sequence.

*A priori* synthetic judgments are confirmed in experience because they are carried out in time. In the same way, all judgments related to mathematics are *a priori* synthetic judgments, confirmed by experience.

#### *Transcendental Analysis*

Transcendental analysis takes the physical sciences as its object, since physics unites everything that we know about the world.

I repeat: Kant does not speak much about consciousness, but rather about pure reason.

Why?

Because it involves an organized, rational knowledge, which appears in science. Here we arrive at a very beautiful Kantian inspiration which resembles the Copernican revolution. Just as Copernicus immobilized the sun and made the earth move, Kant demonstrates that *only the co-relativity of subject and object can form a reality*. The object must be seized by consciousness in order to form reality in time and space. In physics (Newton), we have direct knowledge about *a priori* things.

Example, we can affirm forever (absolute) that all phenomena are subject to the law of causality and Newton's famous law that action equals reaction, for instance [ *sentence incomplete* ].

Once again: how can *a priori* synthetic judgments be possible in physics?

Kant's great coup: our knowledge pertaining to such things is expressed by *judgments*.

Kant took up the classification of judgments according to Aristotelian logic (which was valid in Kant's day).

Aristotle's judgments can be classified by the following criteria:

1. *Quantity*. Example: individual judgments which relate to a single phenomenon. But if you make a judgment like: certain men are white, then you express a particular judgment.

One can also express as judgment that all men are mortal.

2. *Quality*. Affirmative judgments A.  
negative ones B.  
infinite ones C.

(which lead to an infinite judgment: example, fish are not birds).

Kant's discovery consists in deducing—in eliciting— *a category* from each of these judgments.

Example: A. affirmative judgment: "You are French."

(category: UNITY).

B. particular judgment: "Certain men are mortal."

(category of MULTIPLE)

C. universal judgment: "All men are mortal."

(category of the set: TOTALITY).

Consciousness is the fundamental thing.

Object-subject: nothing more.

1. consciousness cannot be a mechanism, nor broken up into parts, because it has no parts. It is a whole.

2. consciousness cannot be conditioned by science. It is what permits science, but science cannot explain something to us about consciousness.

Consciousness is not the brain, nor the body, because I am conscious of my brain, but the brain cannot be conscious.

TAKE CARE not to imagine consciousness as an organism or an animal.

There is an important boundary between science and philosophy. Science establishes its methods, its laws by experience. But it is valid only in the world of phenomena. Science can give us the connection between things, but not direct knowledge about the essence of things.

In appearance, there is a contradiction, because if consciousness is the basic element, how can it have categories? How can one divide it like a scientifically analyzed mechanism?

Categories, judgments, cannot belong to consciousness.

In the Kantian corpus, consciousness judges itself. Kant's fundamental problem is: *How is our knowledge of the world possible?* It is precisely our consciousness that realizes the limits of our consciousness. Here one could imagine that one takes a step back to form another consciousness, which judges the first. In that case a third consciousness must judge the second one, etc. (Husserl).

But consciousness cannot be a judge. Consciousness (following Alain's definition) means *knowing what one knows*, and nothing more. Even this definition is bad, because it divides consciousness. Consciousness is indivisible and unconditional. To tell the truth, in philosophy, one cannot say anything.

What are Kant's categories?

Are these the conditions that make consciousness possible?

In Kant (as I see it) there is this process: consciousness is judged from a distance by another consciousness. It is merely a question of establishing what the conditions of this first consciousness are for the second.

It is only a matter of knowing what the indispensable conditions for this second consciousness are, in order that the first consciousness may be thought about without its elements. Consciousness is impossible for us to imagine.

Kantian categories are the condition for a subject to be conscious of an object. But these conditions cannot have an absolute sense. Categories seem to us like the condition for every judgment about reality.

It must be said (as with time) that the categories are within us. It is we who can capture reality by injecting categories.

Nothing has remained of Kant's fine theories, not even the most important category which comes from conditional judgment (hypothetical), for example:

if I...

therefore I...

did not stay.

But now philosophy deals with other things. These were formal discoveries, but significant ones, because they absolutely revolutionized the notion of consciousness, of the subject-object connection, thus of man and the universe.

# Third Lesson

April 30, 1969

## Kant

Third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Possibility of synthetic judgments

.....

.....

metaphysical

Metaphysical: everything which is not physical, like the soul, the world, and God.

These three components are not direct perceptions (like a chair) but syntheses. Yet the soul is the synthesis of all impressions, because it is man's self (the soul) which assimilates all impressions. The soul is that which receives the perceptions.

The second synthesis, that is, that of the world, is the synthesis of everything. Yet the critique of the idea of the soul consists in demonstrating that all our perceptions are in time, while the soul is not in time. The soul is immortal.

Then Kant moves to the idea of the Cosmos, that is, of the world. He shows that there are four antinomies of pure reason, which exclude each other.

*First antinomy.* The world has a beginning in time and limits in space. This has no meaning, because when the collective world (of things) finishes, we still have space and time. But as the world is the synthesis of everything, it cannot be limited to a limited whole. One must see here a certain philosophical idea which consists of reducing things to obvious facts.

*Second antinomy.* The cosmos is made up simultaneously of divisible and indivisible elements. One can reduce this antinomy to what could be called the limitation of the thing. The thing (or object) must inevitably be limited in order for it to be a thing. That is why time and space cannot be considered things. Yet the concept of thing, in order to reach fullness, must inevitably insert time and space, since the Cosmos signifies absolutely everything that exists. We see a contradiction here, since the Cosmos must be unlimited in time and space in order to include absolutely everything. It is this way when you take an object; you can divide it endlessly. There are no limits for it. The idea of an object therefore contains a contradiction because it must be limited and unlimited at the same time.

*Third antinomy* of the idea of the Cosmos. For us, the Cosmos must have a cause because [ *sentence incomplete*] internally contradictory idea.

*Fourth antinomy.* God must exist for us, and at the same time he *cannot exist*. Kant lists three theological arguments here to demonstrate the existence of God. Now, [ *sentence incomplete*].

*First argument: ontological.* Ontological means everything that concerns the being. We have an idea of God as a perfect being. But a perfect being, to have perfection, must also have the quality of *existing*. This argument seems too sophisticated to me. Kant says that the category of existence is a perception. Yet God cannot be perceived.

*Second argument: cosmological.* The world must have a cause since, according to the category of causality, each thing must have a cause. If this is so, God must also have a cause.

*Third argument: teleological.* *Telos* means *purpose*. Everything that is in the world must have a purpose, must be the work of God. But if God is teleological, then he

himself should be created for an end.

Kant emphasizes that the errors of metaphysics originate in what it implements beyond the limits of experience and its use of categories.

We arrive at the last thesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant demonstrates that our reason is not sufficient to discover what he calls the *noumenon*. \*For example, if you see an object, you have the impression that it is a white object made in a certain way, etc. But if you just put on yellow-tinted glasses, everything changes. Imagine an ant that looks at the same object and sees it only in two dimensions and not three. Now, whether for an ant or for a person donning yellow-tinted glasses, the object will change.

Kant wonders whether pure reason can discover the *object in itself*, objectively, independently of our ways of perceiving it. He notices that this is impossible, and we can never know what the *noumenon*, *the absolute*, is in itself, independent of our own perceptions. We are limited to the phenomenological world. This is important, because you will find this problem in Husserl, Hegel, etc. Our reason must be limited to the phenomenological world.

The *phenomenon* is what I see according to my faculties, and my way of seeing things: Psina, †for me, is white, in time and space. That is the phenomenon. The *noumenon* (the absolute) consists in asking oneself, “How is Psina, not for me, but *in itself*?” The Kantian critique is a *limitation of thought*. Human thinking would consider itself capable of understanding everything. But since Kant, not to mention Descartes, thinking has undergone a reduction and this reduction is extremely important. It demonstrates that thinking reaches a certain maturity, it begins to know its limits, and you will find in all later philosophy, for example, in Feuerbach, in Husserl, in Marx, etc., the same tendency to reduce thought. Today philosophy does not consist of seeking an absolute truth, like the existence of God, but is more limited, limiting itself only to the phenomenological world, where it replaces the question, “What is the world?” with “How to change the world?” (Marx) and it finds the purest expression in the phenomenological method of Husserl, who is not at all interested in the *noumena*, but in phenomena.

*Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant’s second great work.

Today this work is outdated, although it has very authentic passages. Kant wanted to make of it something akin to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But if the *Critique of Pure Reason* speaks about judgments by which one can know the world, the *Critique of Practical Reason* deals with judgments which *qualify things* (the quality of things). Example: this man pleases me, this bread is good.

Here we perceive judgments as imperative judgments.

*Critique of Pure Reason*: it is about understanding, about knowing.

*Critique of Practical Reason*: it is about what I must do, to act (morals).

Now, imperatives can be hypothetical or categorical.

*Imperatives* when the will is autonomous, conditioned by nothing. Example: “One must be moral” is categorical. It does not depend on any condition. If I say that I must be moral in order to go to heaven or to have people’s respect, this is already a hypothetical imperative. This is important because, in our era, we confuse these things.

For Kant, the moral imperative must be disinterested.

Now morality depends entirely on will. Be careful: these are Kantian laws which

are interpreted in a confused way. Example: if my mother is ill and I, with the best intentions of curing her, by mistake give her medicine which kills her, from the moral point of view, I am in order.

That is why one must judge all of history's greatest monsters by their *intentions*: Hitler, Stalin.

If Hitler believed that the Jews were the malady of the world, he was in order from a moral point of view, even though he was wrong. But if he did so out of personal interest, then it is immoral. Morality, for him, is moral will, goodwill.

Aristotle, this is classification, order,  
the objective world.

Man considered as object, animal.

Marx. For Marx, man is object.

[Witold disagrees]. The artist must be in the subjective.

Read Kant's biography by Thomas de Quincey.

## Fourth Lesson

Thursday, May 1, 1969

### Schopenhauer

After Kant, there is a line of thought which could be outlined as follows:

Fichte

Schelling German Idealism

Hegel

“Idealism” why? Because it is subjective philosophy which is concerned with ideas.

Kant had two successors (curious thing) of two different types:

Schopenhauer

Nietzsche

Arthur Schopenhauer (19th century).

Born in Danzig.

He adopts the Kantian system with a formidable difference, which consists of the following.

After Kant, all philosophers wanted to be involved with the thing in itself, the absolute. Yet Schopenhauer gets up and says, “It so happens that no one knows what a thing is in itself, and well, me, I do know.”

The world is stupefied, and Schopenhauer continues: “I know it from internal intuition.” Intuition means direct knowledge, not reasoned but “absolute.”

Schopenhauer’s reasoning is as follows.

Man is also a thing. Therefore, if I myself am a thing, I must seek my absolute in my intuition, what I am in my essence. And, says Schopenhauer, “I know that the most elementary and fundamental thing in myself is the will to live.”

Here a door opens to a new philosophical thinking: philosophy stops being an intellectual demonstration, in order to enter into direct contact with life. For me (in France, almost no one shares my opinion) it is an extremely important date that opens the path to Nietzsche’s will to power, and to all of existential philosophy. We must understand that Schopenhauer’s metaphysical system did not take hold; in this sense, Schopenhauer did not express something solid. Which is why, I suppose, that Schopenhauer has not held his own as a philosopher.

BUT WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? No philosophical system lasts for very long. But for me, philosophy has THE SUPREME VALUE OF ORGANIZING THE WORLD IN A VISION.

For example, there are the extremely grandiose Kantian and Hegelian universes, there is also Nietzsche’s, and it is there where Schopenhauer is important.

Let us move from this vision of Schopenhauer to the Schopenhauerian world.

This is the first time that philosophy touches life.

*What is the will to live for Schopenhauer?*

He himself says that he uses these words because nothing better comes to mind. In truth, it is more the will to be, because for Schopenhauer, not only do man and animals want to live, but also the rock that resists and the light that persists. Schopenhauer says that this is the Kantian *noumenon*, this is the absolute.

IMPORTANT For Schopenhauer, in the metaphysical sense (beyond physical), this concerns a single will to be, absolutely identical for me and for this table.

This will to live, in order to be seen as phenomenon, must assume [ *sentence*

*incomplete*].

It must exist in space and time, in the numerical order of things. It is a single entity, because the numerical world knows neither time nor object, nor anything of the kind.

But when this will to live passes to the phenomenological world, becoming a phenomenon limited by time and space, then it inevitably becomes divided. By the effect of a law that Schopenhauer called *principium individuationis*, it becomes individual, specific. I repeat: Kant demonstrated that we can never penetrate the world of *noumena*; for instance, it is impossible, with reasoning, to prove the existence of God. In this sense, Kant said that our reasoning is limited to the phenomenological world. Time and space are not beyond us, it is the thinking subject which introduces them into the world, therefore we cannot perceive anything infinite, universal like God.

It is only in time and space that the *noumenon* can manifest itself as phenomenon. It is for this reason that Schopenhauer says that the *will to live is a noumenon*. It is beyond time and space, it is within itself and can manifest itself only when it becomes a phenomenon (limited in time and space).

When the will to live is manifested in the phenomenological world, it is divided into a countless number of things that consume one another in order to live. The wolf feeds on the cat, the cat on the mouse, etc.

Schopenhauer's great merit is to have found that decisive thing: death, pain, the eternal war that each being must wage in order to survive.

I always considered that philosophy must not be intellectual but something which starts from our sensibility. For example, for me, the simple fact that I am aware of the existence of a tree has no importance until it brings me pleasure or pain. Only then does it become significant. It is this idea which I try to introduce in interviews, etc.

We are in an absolutely tragic world. They say that Schopenhauer is pessimistic. That is not saying very much. It is a grandiose and tragic vision which, unfortunately, coincides perfectly with reality. Schopenhauer deduces several conclusions from his system.

For example, nature is not concerned only with individuals but with the species. Millions of ants must die in order to generate the species. Likewise, if a man sacrifices himself in a battle, it is also for the same reason. Finally, Schopenhauer was a raging misogynist for the very simple reason that women are involved with the continuation of the species. He said that in love as well, personal happiness cannot exist because the individual is sacrificed for the species. It is very moving, that attentive way in which a young man looks at a young girl, and *vice versa*. They only want to know whether they can have children "of good quality."

We look for our opposites in the opposite sex: big nose, small nose, etc. Man can never attain individual happiness. Our will to live forces us to consume others or to be consumed by them. As a result, Schopenhauer analyzes various noble feelings (example: the woman's love for the child); he demonstrates that all that goes against individual happiness. After that, he likewise shows that what one calls happiness or pleasure is nothing more than the satisfying of a malaise. If you enjoy eating steak, it is because you felt hungry beforehand.

For Schopenhauer, life is a continuous, culpable malaise.

According to Schopenhauer, what possibility is there of leaving this hellish

*imbroglio?*

Suicide? No, this would be useless because by committing suicide, we only confirm our will to live. Because if I kill myself, it is because my will to live was not satisfied.

The sole way of breaking free of the will to live is by renunciation.

*I kill my will to live within myself.*

This is what led Schopenhauer to Hindu philosophy and Eastern philosophy, which is exactly what promulgates meditation and the renunciation of life.

It must be said that this thesis is rather artificial and that the part of his work devoted to eastern philosophy, on the *World as Will and Representation*, is the least convincing.

## Fifth Lesson

Friday, May 2, 1969

Schopenhauer recognizes two possibilities:

1. To affirm the will to live by fully participating in life with its cruelties and its injustices.

2. Not suicide, but *meditation*.

Schopenhauer considers that the contemplation of the world “as if it were a game” is absolutely superior to life. He demonstrates this in an extremely ingenious way. The one who contemplates the world and is filled with wonder is the artist. Now, in this sense, the artist resembles a child, because the child also marvels at the world in a disinterested way. It is for this reason, says Schopenhauer, that children are brilliant, simply because they are children. During our first few years, we make more progress than during the rest of our life. That is why, in the East, the yogi (the one who meditates) attains the unique possibility of suppressing life.

Schopenhauer formulates an artistic theory which, for me, is the most important of all. And, just between us, the extremely naïve and incomplete manner of dealing with art in France is due primarily to the ignorance of Schopenhauer.

Art shows us nature’s game and its forces, namely the will to live. Schopenhauer is *concrete* in this matter. He asks: why does the façade of a cathedral charm us, when a simple wall does not interest us? It is because the will to live of matter is expressed in weight and resistance. Now, a wall does not display the game of these forces, since each particle of the wall both resists and carries weight. While a cathedral façade shows these forces in action, since the columns resist and the capitals press down. We see the struggle between weight and resistance. He also explains to us why a twisted (curved) column does not satisfy us. Quite simply because it does not resist enough. In the same way, a rounded column is better than a square column.

All this to tell you how Schopenhauer sees ART.

It is meditation that he sets in opposition to life.

He also deals with *sculpture* and says that the beauty of man derives from a *prior* anticipation based on experience. The human body is all the more successful since it is well adapted to its ends. He adds that there is within us an ideal of human beauty, which consists of prolonging in the future what we consider to be of quality today, such as long legs. This quality always obliges man to go further in this direction, health, etc. One could say that this is a kind of dream about the design of the species in the future.

For Schopenhauer, the beauty of *Greek sculpture* consisted in a discernment between sexual instinct and beauty. In a word, Greek beauty is not exciting, and that is why it is superior.

*Painting*. If sculpture is primarily concerned with beauty and charm, painting seeks expression, passion, and character in man. Therefore, in painting one can also consider the ugly to be handsome. Example: an old woman. Character unifies a person in painting, because character is what unifies in a sense (direction); if not, man would be disparate.

*Literature*. The artist, in general, does not function by concepts of logic, of abstractions, but has direct intuition of the will to live in the world.