



SOCIETAL PEACE
AND IDEAL
CITIZENSHIP FOR
TURKEY

—

EDITED BY RASIM ÖZGÜR DÖNMEZ
AND PINAR ENNELI

**SOCIETAL PEACE AND
IDEAL CITIZENSHIP
FOR TURKEY**

SOCIETAL PEACE AND IDEAL CITIZENSHIP FOR TURKEY

Edited by Rasim Özgür Dönmez and Pınar Enneli



LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Published by Lexington Books

A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.lexingtonbooks.com

Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2011 by Lexington Books

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Societal peace and ideal citizenship for Turkey / edited by Rasim Özgür Dönmez and Pinar Enneli.

p. cm.

ISBN 978-0-7391-4920-1 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-4922-5 (ebook)
1. Citizenship—Turkey. 2. Minorities—Civil rights—Turkey. 3. Turkey—Ethnic relations—Political aspects. 4. Turkey—Politics and government—1980– I. Dönmez, Rasim Özgür. II. Enneli, Pinar.

JQ1809.A2S63 2011

324.609561—dc22

2011010146

™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Acknowledgments	vii
Introduction	ix
1 Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for Turkey <i>Rasim Özgür Dönmez</i>	1
2 Citizenship and National Identity: A Comparative Analysis <i>Elçin Aktoprak</i>	27
3 The Making of Modern Turkey and the Structuring of Kurdish Identity: New Paradigms of Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century <i>Maya Arakon</i>	49
4 The Alevi Identity and Civil Rights in the Twenty-First Century <i>Fazilet Ahu Özmen</i>	71
5 Gypsies and Citizenship in Turkey <i>Senem Kurt Topuz</i>	95
6 Less than Citizens: The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Question in Turkey <i>Hakan Ataman</i>	125
7 Turks of African Origin and Citizenship <i>Esmâ Durugönül</i>	159

8	Gender and Citizenship in Turkey at the Crossroads of the Patriarchal State, Women, and Transnational Pressures <i>Canan Aslan Akman and Fatma Tütüncü</i>	179
9	The European Union and Turkey: Transformation of the State–Society Relationship <i>Bahar Turhan Hurmi and Bülent Temel</i>	207
10	Social Rights as Ideal Citizenship <i>M. Kemal Öke</i>	227
11	The Turkish Young People as Active Citizens: Equal Participation or Social Exclusion? <i>Pınar Enneli</i>	257
12	Environmental Citizenship and Struggle for Nature <i>Feryal Turan</i>	281
	Conclusion	299
	Index	303
	About the Contributors	309

Acknowledgments

Come, Come again !
Whatever you are . . .
Whether you are infidel, idolater or fire worshipper.
Whether you have broken your vows of repentance a hundred times
This is not the gate of despair,
This is the gate of hope. Come, come again

—Mevlana Jelaleddin RUMI

MEVLANA WAS NOT BORN in this soil, but blossomed here. His ideal is still alive here. So if there could be a possible societal peace in the world, we believe that this soil is a good starting point to try. In this adventure, we would like to thank the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) for sponsoring this book through the project of “Disadvantaged Young People’s Transition to Adulthood in the Metropolitan Areas: Being Part of the Problem or the Solution.” We also would like to thank Ayşe Kaya for her relentless assistance in the formation of this book.

Introduction

IS SOCIETAL PEACE ACHIEVABLE in a society? This question led us to arrange a workshop on citizenship and societal peace at Turkey's Abant İzzet Baysal University in Bolu on April 9, 2010, with the financial assistance of the Turkish Scientific Research Center (TUBITAK) on disadvantaged young people. This book is the result of that workshop and aims to understand the ways and means for ensuring societal peace by evaluating problems about citizenship in the Turkish regime. It also offers the ideal citizenship regime for Turkey in relation to various issues, such as the environment, gender, youth, and poverty.

The Turkish state was built on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, inheriting the empire's transcendental and patriarchal nature and incorporating state-led nationalism to create the ideal Turkish citizens. This process can be deemed as the radical modernization of the Turkish elite in creating a new Turkish society,¹ hampering the Ottoman past, and drawing the boundaries of ideal citizenship—as will be seen in sections of this book—patterned on specific elements, including heterosexuality, the middle class, males, Sunni Hanafi Islam, Turks, and so on.

In recent years, the definition of citizenship through state-led nationalism, secularism, and a free market economy has created crises in politics and society. The implicit ideal of the citizenship envisioned by the state—namely, solely Turkish, Sunni-Hanafi, heterosexual, male-dominated, and free market believers—has been criticized by social movements, particularly after the 1980 military intervention. This ideal is especially criticized for not allowing

different ethnic, religious, and sexual identities to represent themselves in both the political and public spheres.

Although some problems deriving from the existing Turkish citizenship regime are much more visible, such as the Kurdish and Alevi phenomena, others are less obvious but still have potentials to create foreseeable troubles. These include the use of male-dominated violence against women, crimes deriving from homophobia, discrimination against Gypsies and other ethnic and religious groups, and the building of industrial complexes and the hydroelectric *barrel* generators at the expense of the environment and citizens' habitats.

Meanwhile, Turkey's integration into globalization and the European Union processes makes these political and social problems visible, forcing the current government—the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government—to take stock of the solution. Still, this process sometimes forces the state to preserve the orthodox form of the Turkish citizenship regime, thus turning a deaf ear to these demands. In other words, this crisis stems from the transformation of the classical nation-state (i.e., Westphalian) to the denationalization of the nation-state² whose borders are more flexible and in which clashes between these controversial processes occur in the discussion of the citizenship regime. Therefore, the citizenship regime is a strong fault line for these discussions, and the state–society relationship continuously regenerates itself according to the position—namely, first or second—of the Turkish state to its society.

Today, no single hegemonic power dominates the Turkish political and state spheres as social movements, interest groups, and civil society organizations have articulated their problems relatively freely and want to be free players in the political and public spheres. All the existing problems to a great extent reside in a citizenship regime that makes the subject one of the sole issues in the liberalization of politics and the provision of societal peace in the country. Managing these problems by developing a new constitution, while involving all political and social actors in this attempt, is appropriate for enhancing societal peace in the country. Therefore, this book attempts to understand the conflicting areas or subjects in the political and social spheres to offer solutions from the perspective of the citizenship regime.

In this context, Rasim Özgür Dönmez evaluates the dynamics of the Turkish citizenship regime, tracing it back from the Ottoman period onward and trying to analyze the deficiencies of this regime in obstructing societal peace in the country. The writer offers that the new citizenship regime should be based on civic patriotism rather than state-led nationalism and should be approached solely in terms of nation-states (i.e., enacting laws without considering how international agreements lead to societal and political conflicts in society).

Elçin Aktoprak's "Citizenship and National Identity: A Comparative Analysis" sheds light on the formation of national identities and minority nationalisms in Spain, Ireland, and Turkey as well as the relationship between the structure of the citizenship regime and national identities in providing peaceful settlements between national identities and minority identities.

Meanwhile, Maya Arakon and Fazilet Ahu Özmen analyze the problematic relationship between Kurdish and Alevi identities and the official ideology and its citizenship regime, arguing that it is vital to provide constitutional democracy in integrating these identities successfully in the citizenship regime in Turkey. Maya Arakon's chapter, "The Making of Modern Turkey and the Structuring of the Kurdish Identity: New Paradigms of Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century," aims at analyzing the structuring of the Kurdish identity within the construction of modern Turkey and seeks for new paradigms of citizenship that can meet new claims of the twenty-first century. Fazilet Ahu Özmen tries to answer how the Alevis can have equal civil rights and what should be done for this by the society and the government.

In her chapter, Senem Kurt Topuz focuses on Gypsies' citizenship with reference to those in Edirne, where she conducted field research. She evaluates the perceptions of Gypsies on the citizenship regime in Turkey by underscoring their problems. Topuz claims that the government should make some social and economic arrangements to improve Gypsies' life conditions and should enact specific laws to prevent prejudice against them in the society. For the writer, the constitutional democracy that abandons the constitution for ethnic, religious, cultural, and gender-based elements is an effective solution for removing this prejudice.

In addition, Hakan Ataman evaluates the social injustices that lesbians, bisexuals, gays, and transsexuals face in society, stressing the importance of both reactive measures (e.g., adequate legal protections and provisions, regulations, an improved justice system, and the cessation of impunity as ensured by the government of Turkey) and proactive measures (e.g., social protection and cooperation, solidarity, education, the creation of a positive atmosphere for dialogue between different people, and empathy).

Esma Durugönül focuses on the relationship between social exclusion and the Turkish citizenship regime through the Afro-Turkish community in Turkey. The writer analyzes how the Turkish citizenship regime makes the Afro-Turkish community invisible in society and its negative effects on this group such as poverty and prejudice against this group.

Canan Aslan Akman and Fatma Tütüncü analyze the relationship between gender and citizenship regime in Turkey. Their chapter provides an overview of the determinants and the dynamics of the patriarchal construction of citizenship in Turkey from a historical perspective, and its major concern is

with identifying the major cultural, political, and discursive forces preventing Turkish women from fully exercising their social, civil, and political citizenship rights. It highlights specific problem areas in women's experiences of citizenship with a focus on women's civil and social rights, and it underlines the impact of women's groups and transnational influences in the improvement of citizenship. Lastly, the chapter underlines the discrepancy between egalitarian legal rights and their social applications in the era of religiously conservatism.

Bahar Turhan Hurmi and Bülent Temel underline the positive effects of the European Union on the Turkish citizenship regime and their necessary engagement in the progression of social and political liberties in Turkey. The writers point out that one of these prominent changes has been a reformation of the state–citizen binary relationship and its impact on the empowerment of people against the state in their demands for ethnic or religious existence. While the writers argue that this denationalization process promises favorable contributions to a more democratic, diverse, stable, and content Turkish society, it also makes the country more prone to separatism. Unfettered democratization demands by the European Union from its associated countries may jeopardize sociopolitical stability in the European continent.

Mustafa Kemal Öke analyzes the relationship between social inequalities, poverty, and the citizenship regime in Turkey, concluding that the government or state should provide equality and social justice by providing for citizens' essential needs, such as education and accommodation.

Pınar Enneli evaluates the relationship between the citizenship regime and young people in Turkey. The writer argues that the state in Turkey is not inclusive of young people, especially disadvantaged ones, and it does not allow them to be critically active in the political and social spheres. According to Enneli, there is a need to create a new citizenship regime to allow the young people with various backgrounds to involve themselves actively in the decision-making processes.

Feryal Turan further points out the different facets of social injustice in environmental citizenship and their connection with the struggle of the local people suffering from the construction of hydroelectric power plants in Turkey against energy companies and the government. She comments on the importance of environmental citizenship, requiring active citizenship in eliminating social injustice derived from neoliberalism and improving sustainable development.

Notes

1. See Touraj Atabaki and Eric Jan Zürcher, *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah* (London: IB Tauris, 2004).
2. Saskiye Sassen, "Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship," in *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, edited by Engin Isin and Bryan Turner (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 285.

Bibliography

- Atabaki, Touraj, and Eric Jan Zürcher. *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*. London: IB Tauris, 2004.
- Heper, Metin. "The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared." *Comparative Political Studies* 25, no. 2 (1992): 169–94.
- Karaman, Lütfullah, and Bülent Aras. "The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey." *Journal of Economic and Social Research* 2, no. 2 (2000): 39–58.
- Sassen, Saskiye. "Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship." In *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, edited by Engin Isin and Bryan Turner. London, 277–93. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003.

1

Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for Turkey

Rasim Özgür Dönmez

THE POST–COLD WAR ERA led to a new phase in politics that has changed the interaction of domestic and international politics and state–civil society relationship. This new structure ultimately caused the deterioration of the classical nation-state relationship, leading to the prioritization of collective ethnic and ethnoreligious identities over nation-state identity or its trademark, citizenship. This identity-based politics makes citizenship a terrain on which to create antagonism against the state and its ideology. The efforts of Western Europe to integrate Muslim immigrants into its political and social systems or the rise and the demands of the radical rightist movements are some examples of this antagonism. Likewise, Turkey has also witnessed such a development, in that citizenship has become a fault line of this antagonism between the state and the collective identities. Therefore, citizenship has gained multidimensional features in the post–Cold War era and cannot simply be perceived as a legal status signifying the official relationship between the individual and the state.

In this regard, citizenship has three important patterns. The first is the dynamic nature of citizenship. In regard to the changing structure of the political and social spheres, citizenship is not a static concept; rather, it is a dynamic, reproducible, and definable social and political identity. Thus, the concept does not have an ahistoric nature, but corresponds with a reconstructive identity patterned after historical, discursive, and institutional elements. To put it succinctly, the citizenship identity based on rights-freedom-responsibilities, which distinguishes it from all other identities, can be redefined according to

time as well as changing needs and demands. Therefore, citizenship refers not only to a social identity but also a strong political identity by which making politics should be perceived as part of the citizenship.¹ In other words, citizenship can be identified with Aristotle's *zoon politikon*.

In addition, the concept of citizenship is one of the sole instruments of "governmentality" for the state in managing society. Therefore, every state has a "citizenship regime" that is a signifier for the state in its approach to individuals, communities, and cultural identities. In this context, although some identities, cultures, or communities gain privileged positions, others may fall into a secondary position. Consequently, citizenship functions as an inclusion/exclusion mechanism that makes us think of it beyond its legal status.² Finally, Ayşe Kadioğlu's notion of defining the late modern times as "the divorce of nation from state" indicates the culmination of identity politics; recognition of such demands makes the citizenship regime one of the cardinal "governance technologies" in solving these problems.³ In this regard, the citizenship regime may serve as political, social, and cultural terrain for collective identities in their recognition by the state and help form common language between them and the state.

Based on these points, the identity recognition demands of Kurdish, Islamist, and Alevi movements and their sociopolitical protests, as well as drastic economic crises occurring since Turkey's transformation of its economy to a free market economy in 1980, have weakened the state-citizen relationship. In particular, the focal point of this tension between the state and these identities is the citizenship regime in Turkey, thereby demonstrating how the concept of citizenship regime is paramount for Turkey in providing societal peace in the country. This study argues that the citizenship regime in Turkey, patterned on state-led nationalism and the state's political monopoly in the public sphere, has not allowed the emergence of free political participation and active citizenship. In addition, liberalism, to a great extent without social welfare, alienated masses from a feeling of belonging to the Turkish state. Indeed, it has encouraged them to form or become involved in ethnic, religious, and somewhat primordial formations. In this sense, the polarization of the political sphere and society along Turkish-Kurdish, secular-conservative, and similar lines is not coincidental. As such, the Turkish citizenship regime should be repatterned on civic patriotism while the social welfare system should be enhanced in order to address the alienation of citizens to the state.

In this regard, the first section focuses on how and why the concept of citizenship regime has been historically conceptualized by the state and evaluates its consequences. The second section offers a new paradigm beyond state-led nationalism and argues that civic patriotism can be a cure for providing societal peace in the country.

The State, the Public Sphere, and Citizenship in Turkey

Citizenship in the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire, unlike its counterparts in the West, adopted a monist governing system in which citizenship was viewed as the property of Sultan. In this context, the meaning of *politics* in Arabic, *siyaset*, which was used during the Ottoman period as well, etymologically refers to governing the ruling class rather than its Western counterpart (*politics*), which is derived from *polis*, indicating participation in the city's problems.⁴ This noble example of a military and agricultural empire had two important features relating to this study: the overwhelming dominance of the state over society and the composition of society. Compared to European states, Ottoman politics did not consist of different players who could influence power, nor did society intend to challenge power, as did the bourgeois revolution in Europe.⁵

The Ottoman state structure can be categorized into two parts: the governors (*askeriye*) and the governed (*reaya*).⁶ Although intermediaries existed between these strata as well as a very complex bureaucracy, it is not unusual to categorize the two parts in this manner, as Ottoman wealth was based on agriculture (accounting for 90 percent of the population), which made the reaya as a whole an important player in economic sphere. Yet the reaya was to a great extent ineffective in the political sphere, in which it did not have any political rights.⁷ Thus, the relationship between these two sections formed an important part of Ottoman politics.

A second important feature of the Ottoman Empire was its multicultural structure. The system, consisting of various communities—each with different laws and social systems—was called the “millet system.” These communities developed and practiced their own laws without state intervention; as such, in this respect, every community was autonomous. The leaders of these communities were responsible to the state for their communities. The Ottoman policy was to make these groups dependent on the state for two reasons:

- To control these communities from the center
- To close the distance between state and society

A variety of communities, distinguished according to their religions, sects, and ethnic groups, such as the Armenians and Jews, formed the Ottoman society. The Sunni Muslim community was at the top of the hierarchy, with society constructed from various groups with their own educational systems, heritages, and other laws. These communities were only responsible to the state for taxation and military duty.⁸

The citizenship regime can be divided into two periods during the Ottoman Empire. In the first period of the Ottoman Empire (1453–1839), the Ottoman ideology, or Ottomanism, was an elite and imperialistic ideology in which the state elite had different traditions; the society's distinct elite languages strongly internalized this ideology. As previously discussed, the rest of the population—namely, the ruled class—was structured by the millet system, but these communities could not utilize the benefits of the system as the askeriye section of the state did. Although they and their communal freedoms were protected by the state in exchange for paying taxes and accepting the Ottoman borders, they were deprived of political rights and not allowed to engage in politics. The system perceived citizenry as objects of the system and patterned its citizenship regime on the concept of justice, but not equality. The state tried to be fair to its citizens, but it perceived itself as their owner, which did not lead it to open the public sphere as the arena for making politics.⁹

During the second period, starting with the 1939 Tanzimat Reforms, the public sphere was enriched with urban elites from various Muslim and non-Muslim communities. According to Faruk Birtek, the Ottomanism of the Tanzimat period was radically different from the first period. Tanzimat broadened Ottomanism to a larger population by putting further prominence on the urbanity of manners, style, and language.¹⁰ As Birtek remarked, “Thus, once more an imagined class emerged, but now much wider in scope and with full recognition of multiplicities—or better, of multiple layers of identity.”¹¹ Urban elites having multiple identities indicated a citizenship that could negotiate among multiplicities of social spaces without dissolving their private/communal features, albeit differences emerged in situating better positions for themselves in negotiations. In other words, the possibility of carrying multiple identities signified what it meant to be an Ottoman in this period.¹² This process, resembling Habermasian deliberative democracy, led Ottomanism to be extended to relatively large sectors of society and helped find a common language in the name of an Ottoman identity in the public sphere.¹³ Unlike the first period, with the influence of the French Enlightenment, equality became as important as the principle of justice, and making politics became relatively normalized in urban elites.

However, this process did not satisfy both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. For Christian communities, the idea of Ottomanism and the Ottoman Empire itself were no longer an attractive anchor to the Empire. These communities had a new ideal, which was to form their own new nation-states. Meanwhile, Muslim communities were afraid of losing their power against non-Muslim communities or minorities. The establishment and the strengthening of the vigilant paramilitary group *Union and Progress*, particularly within the military in this era, were no coincidence. This vigilante group

would capture the power and—after the Balkan wars and the independence of Albania—begin to transform the state ideology of Ottomanism into Turkism. Hence, the group began to Turkify the empire, which did not lead to multiple identities.¹⁴ In addition, this new movement hegemonized the political sphere and did not allow the common person to engage in politics. This process escalated with the demolition of the Ottoman Empire and continued radically after the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

The Citizenship Regime in the Turkish Republic: Secularism and the Unbearable Lightness of State-Led Nationalism

The demolition of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic paved the way for emerging traumatic nationalism, which had two paradoxical features. First, this nationalism was citizenship-based nationalism, which focused on erasing its Ottoman past in the name of bringing about radical modernity. In this context, it drew a sharp line between modern and nonmodern, the West and the East, and Turkish and non-Turkish. Second, and in contrast to the first feature, the new regime borrowed monist and societal engineering features of the Ottoman Empire, which did not lead to enabling civil society to engage in politics or promote equality for society.¹⁵ As such, the Ottoman legacy continued in the administration and political regime of the new Turkish Republic. These two points intersected in the public sphere and in the citizenship regime, which unfortunately created a fault line between the center and the periphery.¹⁶

The Kemalist establishment (i.e., the center) accepted the dominance and the priority of the West against the East and the modern against the not-modern. In this respect, although the establishment envisaged the public sphere as the terrain of modernity, it identified the private sphere with tradition. Therefore, ethnic and religious differences were not perceived as problems as long as they stayed in the private sphere. This perception resulted from the establishment's ideal, which constructed a direct relationship between the creation of the modern citizenship and the modern nation-state by using the public sphere. Furthermore, this perspective paved the way for confining all the ethnic and religious discourses and symbols to the private sphere. The establishment thought to transform the subject of the Ottoman Empire to modern citizenship through secularism, rationalism, and Republicanism—also called nation-building—while excluding the ethnic, rural, and religious identities from the public sphere. In other words, the republican project created a “communitarian and regulatory” public sphere.¹⁷

Nationalism was the other prominent component of this sphere, and the political elite tried to define citizenship based on nationalism. Mustafa Kemal